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ATTORNEY MISAPPROPRIATION OF CLIENTS' FUNDS: 
A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY* 
Attorneys hold money belonging to their clients in many con-
texts: settlement monies from lawsuits, funds collected by the 
attorney on behalf of his clients, real estate deposits held in es-
crow, fines to be paid on the clients' behalf, advances for costs, 
and pre-paid legal fees for specific services yet to be performed by 
the attorney. Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-102 of the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility 1 requires that any funds belonging to a 
client2 should be maintained in a separate bank account apart from 
monies belonging to a lawyer or his firm. 3 DR 9-102 also requires 
that the attorney maintain complete records of all the clients' 
funds, render an accounting to clients as to their funds, and· 
promptly pay clients all funds in the lawyer's possession which are 
due to them. 4 
• The author wishes to acknowledge the information and helpful criticism provided· by 
Robert Anderson, James H. Bradner, Jr. and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline, 
Edmund N. Carpenter II, Norman A. Faulkner, John H. Neiman, and Eric H. Steele. 
1 The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Ethical Considerations and 
Disciplinary Rules organized under nine Canons. The Canons express general concepts from 
which the more specific Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived. Ethical 
Considerations are "aspirational in character and represent objectives toward which every 
member of the profession should strive." The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, are "manda-
tory in character ... [and] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can 
fall without being subject to disciplinary action." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969). 
The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of Delegates of the 
ABA on August 12, 1969, and became effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970. 
Forty-seven states have adopted the Code by court rule. Telephone interview with E. 
Russell Twist, Director of the Department of Professional Standards, ABA (Mar. 21, 1977). · 
· 
2 DR 9-102(A) does not require that advances paid by clients for future costs or expenses 
be maintained in a separate client trust account. One commentator has suggested that the 
rule is ambiguous as to whether prepaid legal fees for specified services, as distinguished 
from retainers paid merely to insure the availability of the attorney's services if needed, 
must be treated as clients' money prior to performance of the legal services. Carpenter, The 
Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Delaware's Solution, 61 A.B.A.J. 338, 340 (1975). 
3
-ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(A): 
Preserving Identity of Funds and 
Property of a Client 
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs 
and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts main-
tained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the 
lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows: 
(I) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein. 
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the 
lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the 
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or 
law firm to receive.it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion 
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved. 
4 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8). 
415 
416 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415 
Breaches of professional duties in handling clients' funds ac-
count for a large share of the disciplinary penalties imposed on 
attorneys5 and occur in a variety of circumstances. The failure to 
establish a separate bank account for clients' funds and the result-
ing commingling of a lawyer's funds with those of his client consti-
tute a sufficient ground for discipline, although such a violation of 
DR 9-102 is not necessarily an indication of illegal intentions or the 
antecedent to later defalcations. 6 Frequently, commingling is com-
bined with inadequate bookkeeping, which precludes the attorney 
from determining whether he is spending his own money or that of 
his clients. 7 The consequence is often defalcation, which began as 
careless and unintentional misappropriation but evolved into em-
bezzlement as the "borrowing" continued and increased in 
amount. 8 Lawyers occasionally "borrow" from clients' funds to 
cover their own expenses even where a separate client trust ac-
count is maintained. 9 Such illegal borrowing frequently involves 
the attorney in a "web of financ.ial difficulties" that may culminate 
5 In Wisconsin, for example, almost 40 percent of the attorney discipline cases brought 
before the supreme court between 1957 and 1974 involved misappropriation or commingling 
of funds held for clients. Memorandum in support of motion, In the Matter of a Supreme 
Court Rule Requiring Periodic Reports by Attorneys to the State Bar of Wisconsin as to 
Compliance with the Clients' Trust Funds Account Rule, at 2 (Sept. 29,' 1976). Approxi-
mately 32 percent of the disciplinary cases adjudicated by New Yorlc courts between J 929 and 
1962 involved commingling and conversion of clients' money. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' 
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 154 (1966). 
6 Once the clients' funds have been commingled with those of the attorney, there is an 
increased danger that the clients' money will be used for the attorney's personal expenses or 
subjected to the claims of his creditors. "The rule against commingling was adopted to 
provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger 
in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of the clients' money." Black v. 
State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1962). 
Furthermore, the failure of the lawyer to separate his personal funds from those of his clients 
gives the appearance of impropriety and reduces public confidence in the legal system and 
profession. Accordingly, commingling must be discouraged even in circumstances where it 
involves little risk of defalcation. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-5. 
See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. White, 209 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 
1973); In re Windsor, 231 Or. 349, 373 P.2d 612 (1962); In re White, 24 N.J. 521, 132 A.2d 777 
(1957). 
7 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Loveland, 249 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1971); In re Banner, 31 N.J. 24, 
155 A.2d 81 (1959); Clarie v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161, 246 P.2d I (1952). 
8 See note 145 and accompanying text infra. The chairman of a committee appointed by 
th.e Delaware Supreme Court to study and make recommendations regarding the account-
ability of attorneys for clients' funds concluded: 
A thread that appeared to run through most, if not all, of the problem was the 
apparent commingling by the attorney· of his own funds with those of his clients. 
Attorneys initially may have felt that they were spending their own funds, though in 
fact clients' funds were being diverted for personal purposes. At some point mere 
negligence became blatant embezzlement. 
Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338. 
9 See, e.g., State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961), where the misappropriations were 
precipitated when the attorney overextended himself in speculative business investments at 
a time when he was suffering severe mental pressures and personal domestic problems. 
Despite the mitigating circumstances, the attorney's subsequent repentance and rehabilita-
tion, and his. re_stitution of 1111 funds owed, the Court suspended the attorney for six months. 
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in substantial defalcations involving the funds of many clients.10 
Unfortunately, other cases of defalcation involve attorneys who 
have deliberately stolen from their clients .11 
The legal profession's response to the problem of attorney mis-
appropriations traditionally has been limited to establishing and 
enforcing standards for admission to and expulsion from the bar. 12 
Recently, however, the profession has expanded its efforts beyond 
merely regulating membership in the bar. Since 1959, almost every 
state 13 has established a clients' security fund, either by the prom-
ulgation of court rules 14 or through the actions of state bar associa-
tions, 15 in order to compensate aggrieved clients. Subject to 
maximum dollar limitations for any single award, 16 the funds reim-
burse defrauded clients presenting eligible claims. 1 7 
The legal profession has initiated disciplinary processes and 
clients' security funds in order _to achieve certain objectives. This 
10 In re Baron, 25 N.J. 445, 449, 136 A.2d 873, 875 (1957). 
The testimony of a state bar association president noted in the Clark Report suggests that 
attorney misappropriation is usually part of a course of conduct and is not an isolated 
incident. which is unlikely to be repeated. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT [the CLARK COMMITTEE], PROBLEMS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (final draft June 1970) at 18 [hereinafter dted 
as the CLARK REPORT]. 
11 See, e.g., State v. Inglis; 160 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1964); State v. Hoffman, 157 So. 2d 137 
(Fla. 1963). 
12 These efforts have usually focused on the expulsion of dishonest members. See notes 
19-25 and accompanying text infra. Efforts to prevent the admission of dishonest persons to 
the bar have been minimal. 
The bar also attempts to screen out potentially immoral or unethical practitioners in 
the process of admission to the bar. However, examination into the moral charac-
ter of the applicant is uniformly of a limited and routine nature, except for those 
suspected of political nonconformity .... Only a very small fraction of applicants 
are rejected on character grounds. 
J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 162 n.l. . 
A few courts exercising their jurisdiction over the attorney as an officer of the court have 
attempted to aid defrauded clients by entertaining summary proceedings against the offend-
ing attorney. These courts have directed the attorney to pay money owed to his clients, 
attached the attorney's property to cover the debt, or punished· the attorney by fine or 
imprisonment. Permitting such summary proceedings is a matter of judicial discretion, and 
clients have no absolute right to invoke this summary remedy. In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 40 
N.E.2d 247 (1942); Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 46 N.W.2d 187 (1951). 
13 Other than North Carolina, which lias plans to establish a fund, only Utah and Wiscon-
sin have not established clients' security funds. ABA STANDING CoMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' 
SECURITY FUND, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES I (Aug. 1976). Funds have also 
been established in a number of foreign countries, and also in eight Canadian provinces. 
Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 759 (1969). · 
1
• Nine of the 29 state funds responding to an AHA-sponsored questionnaire were created 
by court rule or statute. ABA STANDING COMMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND & 
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT OF THE SURVEY 
oF CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, 1972-1974 [hereinafter cited as CSF SURVEY], schedule C, 
col. 2 I. Afterthe accuracy of the pre-publication draft has been verified, a final draft of the 
Survey will be published in the near future. 
15 Twenty of the 29 state funds responding were established by state bar associations, 
CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 21. · 
16 See notes 87-93 and accompanying text infra. 
17 See notes 69-86 and accompanying text infra. 
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article will delineate these objectives and evaluate whether they 
have been satisfied. Moreover, it will propose additional goals that 
the legal profession, given its present status as a self-regulating 
profession, should attain in satisfying its responsibility for govern-
ing the professional conduct of its members. Finally, additional 
measures that several states have instituted in order to complement 
the efforts of disciplinary agencies and clients' security funds by 
fulfilling unsatisfied needs of profossionai responsibiiiiy wiii be 
examined. 18 
I. EXISTING INSTITUTIONS 
A. The Functions of Discipline and the 
Disciplinary Agencies 
The legal professional has traditionally limited its post-admission 
efforts at self-regulation to disciplining attorneys who have vio-
lated the Code of Professional Responsibility .19 Based upon the 
inherent judicial authority to regulate the conduct of officers of the 
court, the judiciary generally-exercises the power to discipline 
errant attorneys, although the legislature may also .employ this 
power. 20 In most states, the courts have delegated the authority to 
process complaints, conduct investigations, and hold evidentiary 
hearings to bar associations, while retaining ultimate control over 
the imposition of disciplinary penalties.21 Although private repri-
mands and public censures have been used increasingly, the tradi-
tional sanctions for attorney misconduct have been suspension for 
a specific period of time or disbarment with the possibility of 
subsequent reinstatement. 22 The courts have usually employed 
disbarment and suspension as sanctions, because the primary goal 
of professional discipline is to remove unworthy members from the 
18 These additional measures include minimum bookkeeping and accounting require-
ments, filing of an annual certificate by each attorney that outlines efforts to comply with the 
disciplinary rules regarding client trust accounts, and limited audits or "compliance checks" 
of the attorney's books and records. See notes 118-184 and accompanying text infra. 
'" Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. 
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 917, 926 (1976). 
20 In In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. f/J7, 180 N.E. 725 (1932), the court held: 
It is an inherent power of [the judicial branch of the government] ultimately to 
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for 
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those 
lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. 
Id. at 609-10, 180 N.E. at 727. See generally CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-18. 
21 Arkin, Self-Regulation and Approaches to Maintaining Standards of Professional 
Integrity, 30 u. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 807-08 (1976). 
22 Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 924-25; Comment, Discipline of Attorneys in 
Maryland, 35 Mo. L. REV. 236, 248 (1975). 
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bar. 23 Punishment of the individual attorney has generally been 
disavowed as an objective of professional discipline. 24 Rather, 
disbarment and suspension are usually justified on the ground that 
they are the only effective means of protecting the public from 
dishonest attorneys and preserving the legal profession's reputa-
tion for honesty and trustworthiness. 25 
The risk of future misconduct and injury to clients would in-
crease if the punishment of offending attorneys was such as to 
allow them to continue practicing law. First, it would be difficult to 
monitor the performance of an attorney who has once violated the 
Code of Professional Responsibility in order to guard against re-
peated misconduct.26 The intricate and specialized nature of legal 
work usually prevents clients from intelligently evaluating an at-
torney's performance. 27 Yet the complexity of legal work, the 
discretionary latitude that is inherent in the delivery of professional 
services,28 and the requirements of confidentiality regarding the 
affairs of clients probably preclude the effective regulation of at-
torney conduct by anyone other than the client. In view of these 
constraints, the most effective method of insuring that an offending 
attorney will not violate the professional code of conduct again is 
to remove him from the profession. 29 
23 E.g.., In testimony before the Clark Committee, a state supreme court justice stated, 
"[t]he essential purpose of the grievance committee is to remove from the practice of law 
attorneys who might harm the public and the courts." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 98. 
See also Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 925-929. 
An attorney charged with champerty or excessive advertising probably does not merit 
disbarment or suspension. When an attorney misappropriates client funds, however, the 
misconduct strikes at the heart of the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and his 
client and should be viewed as one of the gravest forms of misconduct, warranting expul-
sion. State v. Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1961); Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307 
A.2d 677 (1973). See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra. 
24 Comment, The Objectives of Attorney Discipline: A Pennsylvania View, 79 D1cK. L. 
REv. 558, 561 (1975). 
The Supreme Court has observed, "The proceeding [removal of an attorney as an officer 
of the court] is not for the purpose of punishment, but for the pupose of preserving the courts 
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." Ex parte Wall, 
107 U .s. 265, 288 (1882). 
25 In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d 935 (1943). Some courts view discipline as a 
means of "vindicating the court's dignity," because an attorney has "brought contempt 
upon the administration of justice." See, e.g., In re Long, 287 N. Y. 449, 454, 40 N .E.2d 247, 
249 (1942). Other courts, however, describe their disciplinary functions as being for "the 
welfare of the public, which is always a silent litigant in matters of this type." State v. 
Ruskin, 126 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1961). 
26 Some courts consider a violation to be conclusive evidence of a flaw in the attorney's 
"character" that disqualifies him from further service as an attorney. See, e.g., People v. 
Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 251, 124 N.E. 807, 811 (1919). 
27 Leach, The New Look in Disciplinary Enforcement in England, 61 A.B.A.J. 212, 214 
(I 975). 
28 Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1002. 
29 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, "There is only one discipline for such a 
man for the protection of other possible clients, and that is to put it out of his power to 
misuse his position as a member of the bar, by disbarring him from further practice." 
Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 563, 167 A .. 579, 583 (1933). 
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The limited capacity of the bar to oversee attorney conduct also 
diminishes the deterrent effect of sanctions that are imposed for 
misconduct. Since discovery of a violation of the professional code 
of ethics is uncertain or unlikely, 30 severe sanctions must be im-
posed on the relatively few offending attorneys who are discovered 
in order to deter other attorneys. Thus, while the imposition of a 
less severe punishment than disbarment may be fair with respect to 
the individual offending attorney, it may not serve the broader 
interests of the public and the profession in deterring misconduct 
by other attorneys. 
Given the importance of effective professional self-regulation in 
preserving public faith in the integrity of the administration of 
justice31 and maintaining the legal profession's reputation for 
trustworthiness,32 disbarment is also justified in cases of attorney 
misconduct that involve willful disregard or betrayal of the client's 
interests. 33 The Code of Professional Responsibility states that the 
loss of the respect and the confidence of society and of the mem-
bers of the legal profession is the "ultimate sanction" for unethical 
conduct.34 An attorney who betrays his clients' interests, however, 
indicates that he has inadequate concern for this ''ultimate sanc-
tion." Thus, even if a lesser penalty than disbarment might reform 
the attitudes of an offending attorney and instill in _him a proper 
respect for his professional obligations, his removal from the pro-
fession is necessary to facilitate the restoration of public confi-
dence in the bar. 35 
In attorney defalcation cases, however, the profession may im-
pose lesser penalties in .order to attain a second goal, which is the 
protection of the financial interests of the aggrieved clients. The 
30 Based on a survey of the New York City bar, one commentator concluded, "[v]ery few 
violators are caught and punished by the formal disciplinary machinery of the bar. We 
estimate that only about 2 percent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted ethical 
norms are processed, and fewer than 0.2 percent are officially sanctioned." J. CARLIN, 
supra note 5, at 170. See also Comment, supra note 24, at 582. 
31 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-1. 
32 See Moyerman's Case, 312 Pa. 555, 564, 167 A. 579, 583 (1933). 
33 Misappropriation or misuse of a client's funds clearly falls within this class of profes-
sional misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340,255 N.W. 32 (1934); People v. 
Simmons, 341 Ill. 340, 173 N.E. 398 (1930); People v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807 
(1919). 
34 ABA CooE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble. 
35 See, e.g., In re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 317, 91 A. 494 (1914), where the court 
concluded that when an attorney was convicted of conspiring to conceal- assets from a 
trustee in bankruptcy, disbarment necessarily followed: 
The disbarment that followed was not punitive, but protective simply. Courts can 
command public confidence only as those who serve therein are themselves obser-
vant of the law which it is the duty of the courts to enforce. In his high office, the 
attorney-at-law is a minister of justice; he ceases so to be when, whether in the line 
of his professional work or outside of it, he prostitutes his knowledge of the law and 
the skill he has acquired therein to thwart the law by deceit and falsehood. 
Id. at 495. 
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disbarment of a misappropriating attorn_ey may substantially impair 
his ability to earn an income so that it will be more difficult for his 
clients to enforce judgments forconversion. 36 On the other hand, if 
the disciplinary agency moderates the penalties imposed for defal-
cation on the condition that the_ attorney reimburses his clients, the 
offending attorney is given an incentive to make restitution. Some 
court.s arid disciplinary agencies, influenced by these consid~ra-
tions37 and by the fact that the client has not suffered permanent · 
injury if restitution is made, 38 are willing to impose lesser penalties 
for defalcation. 39 Yet to the extent that attorn·ey misconduct ·is 
treated as a private dispute between the attorney and his clients, 
the, efforts of the legal profession to preserve its integrity and to 
protect the general public may be substantially undercut. 40 
The conflict between the goals of purging the profession of 
dishonest attorneys and securing restitution for defrauded clients is 
reflected in the responses of clients whose funds have been misap-
propriated. Clients understand the, professional standard of con-
duct concerning attorney defalcations because it corresonds to 
general criminal standards of theft. Clients may also be able to 
determine when the standard has been violated, since the resulting 
loss involves a specific amount of money rather than a relatively 
uncertain claim of legal rights. Although these considerations 
suggest that client complaints of misappropriation are more likely 
than other complaints to be brought to the attention of disciplinary· 
agencies/ 1 some attorneys guilty of misappropriating clients' 
funds are never disciplined. 42 
36 See note 106 infra. 
37 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 99. 
38 See, e.g., In re Reed, No. 97 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1977). Citing the.fact of the attorney's full 
restitution, the court limited discipline to a public censure and a $5000 fine, even though the 
attorney had not previously attempted to make up the shortage in the four years following 
his initial misappropriation. See also In re Saba, 253 N.Y.S.2d 323, 22App. _Div. 2d 14 
(1%4). 
39 One commentator-has suggested that most conversion cases in which restitution is 
made following a complaint to a disciplinary agency rarely result in disbarment. If disbar-
ment occurs, a reinstatement in seve_ral years is often the ultimate disposition. Letter from 
Michael Franck, Executive Director .of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author (Jan. 24, 
I 977). (This letter and all other letters quoted in the article are on file in the offices of the 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM. 
40 By withholding discipline when restitution is maik the ethical standards of the profes-
sion are not maintained and the confidence of the public is diminished. The offending 
attorney may misappropriate the funds of other clients, perhaps without further detection. 
The minimal risks involved in unsuccessful attempts at conversion fail to provide an 
effective deterrent to attorney defalcations. CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 98. 
41 The factors which cause a client to lodge a complai11t are crucial, because investigations 
of an attorney's conduct seldom occur without a client complaint. Other lawyers and judges 
rarely lodge complaints against their colleagues. Furthermore, disciplinary agencies gener-
. ally lack the authority or the desire to investigate attorney behavior in the absence of a client 
complaint. Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: ls It Se[f-
Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 206-07 (1974). 
42 Although disciplinary agencies may reduce the penalties imposed on defalcating attor-
neys, the agencies generally are not responsible for the fact that some attorneys complete_ly 
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In ord~r to maximize the opportunity for restitution, the ag-
grieved client or an attorney subsequently retained to represent the 
client may seek a private settlement with the offending attorney 
rather than a filing of a disciplinary charge. 43 Even where there is 
the possibility of an award from a client's security fund, the client 
may still seek a private settlement. The criteria which claimants 
must satisfy before becoming eligible for a fund award44 may 
substantially delay or completely deny an award to the ciient. For 
example, many funds require that an attorney be disciplined by the 
bar before an award may be made to the victimized client,45 and 
this requirement may subject the client to an unacceptably time-
consuming series of disciplinary proceedings. 46 If the client is 
eligible for a clients' security fund award, the maximum dollar 
limitations on the award of many funds47 may result in less than full 
reimbursement of his losses. Consequently, even a claimant eligi-
ble for an award may decide to pursue a private settlement. 
The decision of clients to seek private settlements rather than to 
file complaints in cases of attorney defalcation weakens profes-
sional discipline by failing to prevent or deter the misappropriating 
attorney from engaging in further embezzlements. 48 Moreover, the 
pressure on the attorney to make restitution to a client in order to 
avoid disciplinary penalties may jeopardize the monies of other 
clients of the attorney. 49 Private settlements thus clearly under-
mine the profession's efforts to discipline defalcating attorneys. In 
the absence of an alternative means by which clients can receive 
escape sanction. Disciplinary personnel accord a high degree of credibility to client com-
plaints alleging misappropriation. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 41, at 206-07. As a result, 
defalcation complaints are more likely to survive the initial screening by disciplinary agen-
cies which results in the summary rejection of as many as 90 percent of all client complaints. 
Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 982. 
43 CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 169. Attorneys retained by clients seeking restitution 
from a defalcating attorney must promptly report the offending attorney's misconduct. "A 
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of a Disciplinary Rule shall report 
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such 
violation." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR l-103(A). 
44 See notes 69-86 and· accompanying text infra. 
45 See notes 80-86 and accompanying text infra. 
46 John W. Bryan, a past chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security 
Fund, has estimated that the usual delay between the filing of the complaint and the 
conclusion of the disciplinary process is from one to three years. Bryan, supra note 13, at 
757. As the Clark Report recognized, the delay between the receipt of a complaint and the 
entry of a court order imposing discipline is a significant problem in disciplinary enforce-
ment. The delay is attributable to the backlog of cases, the haphazard scheduling, and the 
numerous stages in the disciplinary procedure which "far exceed the requirements of due 
process." CLARK REPORT, supra note IO, at 30-38, See also Florida Bar v. Randolph, 238 So. 
2d 635 (Fla. 1970), where disbarment proceedings did npt reach the court until seven years 
after the initiation of the disciplinary process and over ten years from the dates of the earliest 
alleged defalcations. 
47 See notes 87-92 and accompanying text infra. 
48 CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 168. 
4" fd. 
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substantial and prompt reimbursement, however, there may be 
little prospect for avoiding such settlements, unless the defalca-
tions which lead to settlements can be prevented. 
B. Clients' Security Funds 
The clients' security fund is a means by which the members of 
the legal profession contribute their own monies to reimburse 
clients injured by the dishonest actions of their lawyers.50 Many 
funds, financed by appropriations from general bar dues, receive 
either a fixed annual contribution from the bar or an amount which 
varies from year to year depending on the degree to which the fund 
has been depleted by awards to clients. 51 Alternatively, other 
funds are financed by fees assessed against each attorney which 
are specifically designated for the clients' security fund and are in 
addition to bar dues. 52 
Trustees appointed by the court or the bar association administer 
the funds' operations53 and generally serve without compensa-
tion.54 The trustees are authorized to manage and invest the assets 
50 Since 1970, New Jersey has authorized the payment of over $1,000,000 in ·claims. 
Amster, Clients' Security Funds: The New Jersey-Story, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610; 1614 (1976). 
Michigan has reimbursed approximately 75 claimants since 1969, providing over $370,000. 
Letter from David 0. Haughey, Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar 
of Michigan, to the author (Nov. 15, 1976). 
51 Of the 34 funds responding, 17 funds received lump sum appropriations as needed, and 
10 received appropriations regardless of need. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, 
cols. 19a-19d. 
The Oregon fund, for example, is authorized to draw its money from transfers by the 
board of governors of other state bar funds, annual payments of up to five dollars which the 
board of governors may impose on each active member of the bar;investment income of the 
fund, and claims recovered against the attorneys whose clients have been reimbursed by the 
fund. OR. REv. STAT. § 9.635 (1975). 
52 Of the 34 states responding, 8 funds are financed by the direct assessment of state 
attorneys ·or bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols. 
19a-19d. 
In Delaware, for example, the amount levied against each attorney varies with the length 
of time the attorney has been a member of the bar. For lawyers- who have been in the 
Delaware Bar for ten or more years, the annual assessment is $100. However, once the fund 
has accumulated net assets of over $100,000, the subsequent assessment for all members is 
only $10. DEL. CT. R. 32A(5). 
53 E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(l)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121. l(b); Mo. CT. R. 1228(b)(2); N.J. CT. R. 
l:28-1(a). 
For example, the court-established Iowa fund is administered by a seven person commis-
sion, which is empowered to recommend rule changes to the court concerning attorney 
defalcations and to assist the court in administering Iowa's program of compliance checks. 
Two of the seven commissioners must be nonlawyers. IowA CT. R. 121. l(c). 
54 E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(2)(f); IowA CT. R. 121. l(f); Mo. CT. R. 1228(c)(6); N.J. CT. R. 
I :28-l(e). Twenty-six of the thirty-five funds responding do not permit attorneys to receive a 
fee for representing a client before the trustees. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, 
col. 16. 
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of the furid, to evaluate the claims of aggrieved clients, to make 
awards, to enforce claims for restitution arising by subrogation or 
assignment,55 to file written and financial reports, and to hire 
consultants, legal counsel, and other employees. 56 Generally, the 
trustees are vested with exclusive and unreviewable authority in 
performing their primary task, which is to determine whether a 
claim merits reimbursement, and if so, what is the proper amount 
of reimbursement.57 
1. Debt of Honor-Two objectives or justifications are commonly 
cited as the reason for creating clients' security funds. The first 
objective is premised on the belief that the profession as a whole 
owes defrauded clients a "debt of honor. " 58 The profession repre-
sents its members to the public as being "honorable, learned and 
skilled," and "when this trust is betrayed, the profession as a 
whole has a duty to rectify the wrong committed against a 
client. " 59 The client has "relied upon the profession's collective 
representation" 60 and the profession has an obligation to remedy 
the losses stemming from such reliance. 61 
Most commentators have contended that only full reimburse-
ment of all clients' losses can totally repay the professional debt of 
honor. 62 Therefore, in judging the success of existing ft!nds in 
satisfying this objective, tlte extent to which the funds ~ave 
55 See note 82 and accompanying text infra. 
56 E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(3); IOWA CT. R. 12l.3(d); N.J. CT. R. 1:28-4,-5; WYO. CT. R. 
22(3,4). 
57 See, e.g., DEL. CT. R. 32(A)(7)(a); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(2); WYO. CT. R. 22(3). But see 
Folly Farms I, Inc. v. Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund of the Bar of Md., No. 159 (Md. 
Ct. App., filed Sept. 16, 1976), where the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed its amend-
ment of the court rules governing the clients' security fund permitting claimants whose 
claims have been denied by the trustees to appeal their decision to the court. The trustees 
can be reversed by the court where the trustees' decision was arbitrary and capricious, was 
unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, was not within the 
authority vested in the trustees, was made upon unlawful procedure, or was uriconstitutional 
or otherwise illegal. MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2). See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra. 
58 See generally Smith, The Clients' Security Fund: 'A Debt of Honor Owed by the 
Profession', 44 A.B.A.J. 125 (1958); Voorhees, Clients' Security Fund in 196/: A Progress 
Report, 47 A.B.A.J. 494 (1961). , 
59 Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where Does the Legal 
Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw. 382, 385 (1967). 
60 ld. 
61 Some courts have justified the judiciary's responsibility for attorney discipline in 
analogous terms, as an effort to prevent the detrimental reliance of clients on dishonest 
attorneys which may have been encouraged by collective representations of professional 
competence: 
By admitting [an attorney to the bar] the court presents him to the public as worthy 
of its confidence in all his professional duties and relations. If afterwards it comes 
to the knowledge of the court that he has become unworthy it is its duty to 
withdraw that endorsement, and thereby cease to ,hold him out to the public as 
worthy of professional employment. 
1n re Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 121 (1880). 
82 See, e.g., Amster, supra note 50, at 1613; Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund 
Maintains Bar's lntegrity, 44 FLA. B.J. 130, 132 (1970). But see notes 93-97 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
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reached the goal of full reimbursement should serve as the primary 
criterion. Three significant aspects of existing funds have limited 
their ability to attain the objective of full reimbursement. 63 
One aspect in which many funds are deficient is the failure to 
publicize their activities. Since clients will present claims against a 
fund only if they are aware of its existence, publicity about a fund 
is essential. 64 Accordingly, some funds pursue an aggressive public 
relations policy, publicizing the names of the clients whose claims 
are satisfied, the name of the defalcating attorney, and the nature 
of the misconduct involved. 65 Other funds, perhaps motivated by 
the idea that publicity about lawer misconduct is a gratuitous and 
misguided effort at self-exposure,66 do not extensively publicize 
their existence and activities. 67 
The criteria that a claimant must satisfy to be eligible for an 
award constitute a second limitation on the capacity of present 
funds to provide full reimbursement. Particular justifications may 
be cited to support each eligibility criterion, but the pertinent 
inquiry in each case is whether the justifications outweigh the 
consequences of the fund's inability to indemnify fully the injured 
clients who cannot satisfy the eligibility criteria. 68 
All clients' security funds limit their reimbursements to losses 
attributable to intentional attorney misconduct and do not reim-
burse losses due to attorney negligence. 69 Nevertheless, it may be 
63 The inadequacies of clients' security funds have caused several jurisdictions to con-
sider mandatory bonding of all attorneys as an alternative to the funds. See. e.g., Carpenter, 
supra note 2, at 338. Bonding has been almost universally rejected, however, primarily 
because of its expense. Moreover, bonding would effectively transfer the power to deter-
mine which lawyers should practice law from the bar admissions committees and the courts 
to the surety companies. Manahan, Lawyers Should be Audited, 59 A.B.A.J. 3% (1973). 
64 There appears to be a positive correlation between public awareness of the fund and the 
number of claimants. Letter from John W. Gould, Chairman, Oregon Client Security Fund, 
to the author (Feb. 7, 1977). 
65 Of the 34 state funds responding, 15 funds indicated that they publicized the activities of 
their funds. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17. The publicity policy of the 
Florida Bar, for example, is expressly aimed at encouraging all clients who have suffered 
losses to apply for reimbursement. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the 
Florida Bar, to the author (Jan. 31, 1977). 
66 Outcault & Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and Professional Standards in California: A 
Progress Report, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 686 (1973); Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 130. 
67 Of the 34 state funds responding, nineteen funds indicated that they do not engage in 
any publicity. CSF SURVEY; supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 17. 
68 Two eligibility criteria require little discussion. Claims arising from misconduct that 
occurred before the establishment of the fund are usually denied. E.g .. IowA CT. R. 
I21.3(j)(l)(b); MD. CT. R.1228(i)(5). A few funds require that claims must be brought w_ithin 
a relatively short period of limitations. Note, supra note 59, at 394. 
69 While this limitation corresponds to the practice of funds in other common law coun-
tries, the Norwegian fund reimburses losses stemming from both malpractice and dishon-
esty. It has been argued that effective protection of clients requires either the creation of 
funds with such expanded coverage or the institution of mandatory malpractice insurance. 
Bryan, supra note 13, at 760; Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director, 
ABA Center for Professional Discipline (Jan. 6, 1977). Since 1971, every practicing lawyer in 
Ontario. Canada, has been required to participate in a compulsory errors and omissions 
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difficult to distinguish between malpractice and intentional theftin 
cases where the client has paid an advance fee for particular 
services, 70 and the attorney subsequently performs few, if any, 
services while retaining all or most of the money. A number of 
funds reimburse a client where no services have been performed 
and the advance fee has been kept by the attorney. 71 Partial per-
formance of the services, however, may preclude reimbursement 
from the clients' security fund for the losses, thus relegating the 
client to procedures established by the bar to arbitrate fee dis-
putes. 72 
A few of the clients' security funds established by voluntary, 
nonintegrated state bar associations independently of legislative or 
court authorization have limited the scope of reimbursable losses 
to claims involving attorneys who are members of the associa-
tion. 73 These organizations justifiably question their obligation to 
cover losses stemming from actions of nonmember attorneys 
whose conduct cannot be effectively monitored by the association. 
However, since one purpose of the funds is to protect the justifi-
able reliance of clients, such a limitation on awards is not entirely 
appropriate. A client's reliance on the honesty of his attorney is 
unlikely to be contingent upon whether the attorney is a member of 
the state bar association. 74 Funds established by statute or court 
rule can more equitably distribute the burden of underwriting 
awards in states with voluntary, nonintegrated bars, because such 
funds can draw on contributions from all attorneys in the state. 7~, 
Another significant limitation on awards from the funds is that 
the loss must have been suffered in transactions that occurred 
within the "attorney-client" relationship. 76 For instance, the pro-
fession does not recognize any _obligation to \ndemnify losses at-
insurance program, which insures every attorney against claims for negligence. Manahan, 
supra note 63, at 397. 
70 Such payments of fees are to be distinguished from "retainers," which are paid to an 
attorney to assure his availability for possible future employment and belong to the attorney 
immediately upon payment. 
71 Letter from John. H. Neiman, Chairman, Iowa Client Security and Attorney Disciplin-
ary Commission, to other members of the Commission (Feb. 18, 1976). 
72 Steele & Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1011-13. 
73 The bar associations of three states have established funds which provide awards only 
for losses due to the illegal activities of bar association members. CSF SURVEY, supra note 
14, at schedule C, cols. 7, 21. 
74 The public is unlikely to distinguish between members and nonmembers of the state bar 
associations. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758. 
75 In Iowa, for example, the fund has been established by court rule and the court has 
required a contribution from each attorney as a condition of maintaining the right to practice 
law in the state. IowA CT. R 121.3(i)(I). Any attorney who fails to make timely payment of 
the required assessment and has been served with a notice of delinquency is summarily 
suspended. IOWA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7). 
76 See, e.g., Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, Art. XVII; OR. REV. STAT. § 9.625 
(1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(6)) (1953). 
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tributable· to a lawyer when he has defaulted on a loan from a client 
or has acted as a business partner or investment counselor for the 
client, rather than as an attorney. Some funds also deny claims 
resulting from an attorney's actions in his capacity as an executor, 
trustee, guardian, or other kind of fiduciary, provided the attorney 
was not acting in his professional capacity as a lawyer. 77 
In contrast, the New Jersey fund bases its criteria for a com-
pensable claim on a causal relationship; a loss is reimbursable 
where the trustees of the fund find that it would not have occurred 
"but for the fact that the dishonest attorney enjoyed an attorney-
client relationship with the claimant at the time of or prior to the 
loss. " 78 In applying this standard, the trustees consider the dispar-
ity of bargaining power between attorney and client, their respec-
tive educational backgrounds and levels of business sophistication, 
whether unusual trust and confidence was placed in the attorney 
because of his status as an attorney, and whether the attorney-
client relatio'nship gave the dishonest lawyer access to information 
about the client's financial affairs that would not ordinarily have 
been available. 79 By focusing on the nature of the client's reliance 
on the attorney instead of on whether the transaction was part of an 
attorney-client relationship, the "but for" test more accurately 
determines which client claims involve a professional debt of 
honor. 
Many clients' security funds require that a client exhaust his 
legal remedies against an attorney before he is eligible for an 
award. 80 The legal expenses involved in satisfying this requirement 
may deter many clients from applying for an award. 81 Other funds 
do not require that a client first sue to recover his money, but 
require that a claimant enter a subrogation agreement with the 
fund, assigning his rights against the defaulting attorney to the 
77 Funds in six states do not permit recoveries for claims arising from an attorney's breach 
of a fiduciary duty. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, col. 9. 
78 Amster, supra note 50, at 1613. The Ontario fund has adopted a similar standard with 
respect to losses arising from a solicitor's dishonesty in a debtor-creditor relationship. 
Address by Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., Joint Meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on 
Clients' Security Fund and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Aug. 4, 1973). 
In relaxing the attorney-client relationship requirement, the "but for" standard approxi-
mates the standard used by the courts in imposing disciplinary penalties or providing 
summary remedies. A significant number of disciplinary sanctions are imposed for conduct 
arising outside the attorney-client relationship, and courts have provided summary remedies 
for victims of attorney defalcation even where a conventional attorney-client relationship 
did not exist. See cases cited in Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 137, 46 N.W.2d 87, 90 
(IQ51). Cf. note 12 supra (discussing the summary remedy). 
79 Amster, supra note 50, at 1613. 
80 Nineteen of the 38 funds responding require that a client exhaust all legal remedies 
against his attorney before applying for an award from the fund. CSF SURVEY, supra note 
14, at schedule C, col. 4. 
81 In contrast, the summary judicial remedy of restitution against defalcating attorneys 
avoids imposing this extra burden on defrauded clients. Bowling Green Sav. Bank v. Todd, 
52 N.Y. 489, 493 (1873). See generally_ notes 12 and 78 supra. 
428 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415 
trustees. 82 Many funds also condition payment of awards on the 
discipline or criminal conviction of the embezzling attorney. 83 This 
requirement encourages clients and other attorneys to file early 
reports of professional misconduct. 84 It also ensures that either a 
court or a disciplinary agency will determine whether a client's 
losses were caused by a lawyer's dishonest misconduct in his 
capacity as an attorney, thereby saving the trustees from making 
such a determination. Unfortunately, this requirement also sub-
jects the claimant to a possibly prolonged delay until final court 
action is completed, which may encourage him to seek a private 
settlement instead of filing a complaint and applying for an 
award. 85 This problem may be solved by authorizing the clients' 
security fund to make an award prior to the conclusion of the 
disciplinary process where the necessary facts have been deter-
mined or are uncontested. 86 
In addition to inadequate publicity and restrictive criteria for 
eligible claims, the dollar limitations on the awards of clients' 
security funds also contribute to the failure of many funds to repay 
in full the collective "debt of honor" of the profession. Many funds 
have maximum dollar limitations for reimbursements.87 The limita-
tions of the New Jersey fund are among the most generous of any 
fund: $15,000 for any individual claimant and a total of $200,000 for 
claims stemming from the course of misconduct of any single 
attorney. 88 In contrast, however, some funds limit their awards to 
$5,000 perclaimant.89 Since the trustees of most funds are invested 
82 See, e.g., N .J. CT. R. I :28-3(e). The New Jersey fund has had limited success in 
enforcing claims against attorneys: 
The primary reason is that many of these individuals have not only been disbarred 
but also have spent a term in prison and are not likely candidates for remunerative 
employment on their release .... Efforts are being made to improve the collecti-
bility of these claims, but the trustees are not sanguine in this area. 
Amster, supra note 50, at 1613. 
83 Twenty-six of the 38 funds responding require that the attorney be formally disciplined 
before any award can be made to his clients. In 15 of the 29 jurisdictions responding, 
conviction of a crime is sufficient grounds for permitting an award. CSF SURVEY, supra note 
14, at schedule C, cols. 8, 12. 
84 CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 191. 
85 See note 46 and accompanying text supra. 
86 Address by J. Stanley Mullin,- Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Se-
curity Fund, Virginia Bar Association (July 15, 1972). 
N.J. CT. R. I:28-3(a)(2) provides: 
If none of these events [professional discipline, criminal conviction] has occurred 
or is likely to occur, an ethics committee certifies a claim to the trustees as an 
appropriate matter for their consideration .... Where an ethics committee does 
not act and an attorney cannot be located, is deceased or incapacitated, the trustee 
may consider timely application directly provided that the trustees find that the 
claim is an appropriate matter for their consideration. 
87 Twenty-two of the 40 funds responding place maximum dollar limitations on their 
1wards. CSF SURVEY, supra note 14, at schedule C, cols. 23, 24. 
88 Amster, supra note 50, at 1612. 
89 Six of the 40 funds responding have a maximum dollar limitation of $5000 or less per 
claimant. CSF SURVEY, stipra note 14, at schedule C, col. 23. 
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with the power, which they exercise "at their sole discretion," to 
determine the amount of each reimbursement, 90 the trustees may 
make awards in excess of the dollar limitations. On the other hand, 
the trustees' discretionary powers are seemingly sufficient to per-
mit an award which does not fully reimburse a client's losses, even 
though the losses are within the dollar limitations.91 The client 
probably has no recourse in such a case because clients' security 
fund awards are usually made as a matter of grace and not as a 
matter of right. 92 
Several explanations have been advanced in support of the dis-
cretionary powers and the dollar limitations on awards to eligible 
claimants. Provisions for trustee discretion have been justified by 
the unavailability of statistical data concerning attorney defalca-
tions, which prevents the trustees from accurately estimating the 
volume and magnitude of future claims and requires the trustees to 
exercise restraint in making awards. 93 It has also been argued that 
the dollar limitations of clients' security funds are analogous to the 
maximum awards payable by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration to depositors. 94 The limitations on both FDIC and clients' 
security fund awards may escape criticism because the small client 
or depositor, for whom a loss in an amount that is within the 
limitations would be catastrophic, is fully reimbursed. 95 Dollar 
limitations are also defended as temporary provisions to protect 
fledgling funds from being "bankrupted" by large claims during 
their initial years of existence.96 
All of these justifications for providing less than full indemnifica-
tion have merit, yet it can be argued that the real reason for dollar 
limitations and discretionary powers is the bar's reluctance to pay 
the money necessary to reimburse all eligible claimants. The ABA 
Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has recently re-
90 E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(a); IowA CT. R. 12l.3(j)(2); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(I); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. 18-1-2 (Rule 14(a)) (1953). 
91 The trustees of many funds are either encouraged or required to consider several 
factors in determining the amount of an award: the degree of hardship suffered by the client, 
the negligence of the client, if any, which may have contributed to the loss, and the amounts 
available to the fund for payment of awards and the number and size of eligible claims that 
have been or may be presented. It would seem that any one of these factors might serve as a 
justification for limiting an award to an amount less than the loss suffered. 
92 E.g., DEL. CT. R. 32A(7)(b); IOWA CT. R. 121.3(j)(4); MD. CT. R. 1228(i)(2); N.J. CT. 
R. I :28-3(d). But see note 57 and accompanying text supra. · · 
93 Mullin, Clients' Security Funds: Where We Are, What's Ahead, BAR EXECUTIVE KEY 
HANDBOOK (Mar. 1972). 
94 Smith, supra note 58, at 128. Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing 
Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971). 
95 Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr., Assistant Director of the ABA Center for 
Professional Discipline (Jan. 6. 1977). 
96 Address by J. Stanley Mullin, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Se-
curity Fund, Arkansas Bar Association (June 4, 1971). 
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ported that the majority of funds are either inactive or ineffective.97 
The inactivity or ineffectiveness of these funds stems largely from 
inadequate financing, which has apparently been a principal prob-
lem with the funds since their inception. In 1961, the chairman of 
the ABA Standing Committee noted that the profession had ac-
cepted the obligation to repay a debt of honor, and that "the only 
one real hurdle" which the funds faced was "the matter of dollars 
and cents. " 98 The chairman found an "unwiiiingness io appropri-
ate money out of the state bar treasury, resistance to an increase in 
association dues," and apprehension that the clients' security fund 
would lead to "the bankruptcy of the state Bar. " 99 
The reluctance of attorneys to underwrite the limited awards of 
existing funds suggests that they may not accept the added finan-
cial cost of a program of full reimbursement. Since some funds 
presently require substantial contributions from every attorney in 
the state, perhaps attorneys should not be required to shoulder this 
additional burden alone .100 One alternative source of funding be-
sides the contributions of attorneys is the interest which might be 
derived from client trust accounts. Few, if any, attorneys presently 
maintain their trust funds in interest bearing accounts, but instead 
place the money in noninterest bearing demand accounts. 101 At-
torneys themselves may not keep the interest earned on funds held 
in trust, 102 and the high turnover of the numerous deposits in any 
one account makes the proration of the interest earned among 
clients economically infeasible and often physically impossible. 103 
Florida is now considering a program, similar to those in operation 
in Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which would permit banks 
to pay interest earned on trust fund deposits to finance clients' 
security fund awards. 104 Of course, while such a program might 
permit full reimbursement of client losses, it may be questioned 
whether clients should be asked to help pay the profession's debt 
of honor. 
97 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, REPORT TO THE ABA 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 1976). 
98 Voorhees, supra note 58, at 494-95. 
99 Id. at 495. See also Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 130. 
100 Most attorneys in New Jersey are assessed fifty dollars a year to support the state clients' 
security fund. N .J. CT. R 1 :28-2. Delaware and Iowa attorneys who have been in practice for a 
number of years must pay one hundred dollars annually until the assets of the fund reach a 
specified amount, after which the assessment drops to ten dollars per year. DEL. CT. R. 
32A(5); IowA CT. R 121.3(i). 
101 Florida Bar News, Dec. 1976, at 6. 
102 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 
545, 991 (May 5, 1962), (July 3, 1967). 
103 Brief of the Florida Bar in Support of Petition for Amendment of Integration Rule and 
Code of Professional Responsibility to Provide for Voluntary Attorney Participation in a 
Supplemental Clients' Security Fund Program at 12 (Mar. 11, 1977). 
10
• Id.; Florida Bar News, Mar. 10, 1977, at 4. 
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2. Preserving the Privilege of Self-Regulation-The second goal 
of clients' security funds is based upon the expectations of clients 
and the general public that arise not from the representations of the 
bar, but from the self-regulating nature of the profession. 
The public looks to the profession to keep its own house in 
order and when a lawyer embezzles his clients' funds the whole 
bar is blackened in the public eye. The rest of us, as well as the 
embezzler, are considered at fault because we have failed to 
police our own ranks and to prevent the defalcation. 105 
This second justification presumes that the public will view the 
suspension or disbarment of an offending.attorney after a defalca-
tion has occurred as an inadequate response by the profession 
because these sanctions do not refund the client's money, and the 
losses of the individual client are seldom reimbursed by the defal-
cating attorney .106 Accordingly, the bar perceives the clients' se-
curity fund as a means of accommodating the public demand for 
accountability, while quelling public dissatisfaction and preserving 
the freedom of the legal profession to regulate itself without public 
intervention .107 
It is not clear whether clients' security funds have actually 
helped to minimize public dissatisfaction with the legal profes-
sion's self-regulation. 108 One reason may be the imperfect public 
understanding that the funds are largely a voluntary undertaking of 
attorneys who have no binding obligation to provide reimburse-
ment. It has been argued that the public appreciates the gratuitous 
nature of the fund and understands why losses may not be reim-
bursed in full. 109 Nonetheless, some victimized clients resent the 
lOS ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, Report 3 (Feb. 1959), 
quoted in Note, supra note 59, at 384. 
106 A former chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund has 
noted that "rarely, in the case of an attorney's misappropriation, is complete or partial 
restitution made, and rarely is a civil judgment collectible." Address by J. Stanley Mullin, 
Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Virginia Bar Association 
(July 15, 1972). 
107 One commentator has suggested that self-protection is a primary purpose of the funds. 
"Although we have often called the clients' security fund a debt of honor, I truly believe that 
the existing threat to our exclusive self-government makes a clients' security fund a neces-
sary supplement to our existing disciplinary procedures." Address by J. Stanley Mullin, 
Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Arkansas Bar Association 
(June 4, 1971). Another commentator has suggested that the disciplinary efforts .of the; 
agencies of the bar are aimed at forestalling public criticism and control of the legal 
profession. J. CARLIN, supra note 5, at 161. 
108 E.g .. Brian E. Toland, a past chairman of the Compensation Fund Committee of the 
English Law Society, has stated that the client security fund "has done more than anything 
else to enhance the prestige and honour of the profession." Smith, supra note 58, at 125. 
E.g .. Edmund N. Carpenter II has reported that the Trustees of the Delaware Client Security 
Fund "doubt if any- goodwill has been created by their client security fund." Address by 
edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Workshop (Feb. 12, 1976). 
10
• See,. e.g .. Bryan, supra note 13, at 758. 
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eligibility limitations on awards and perceive the fund "as an 
insurance company that is delaying in paying claims rather than a 
voluntary fund supplied by other attorneys to minimize the bad 
experience which they have received. " 110 In light of these conflict-
ing reports, it is unclear whether the funds have enhanced public 
goodwill toward the bar. 
The publicity that is essential to a public understanding of the 
contributions of the bar in establishing clients' security funds also 
necessarily reveals the misconduct of attorneys. 111 Public cogni-
zance of the commendable professional efforts at reimbursement 
will be accompanied by a greater awareness of the extent of attor-
ney defalcations. Accordingly, questions regarding the profes-
sion's capacity for self-regulation may be raised. As a result, pub-
licity concerning awards to claimants might prove counterproduc-
tive by leading to public demands that attorney discipline be hand-
led by some agency outside the legal profession. 
The dilemma which confronts the profession's efforts to pub-
licize clients' security funds evidences the fact that the funds 
cannot substitute for an effective program of self-regulation .112 
Payments from such funds will neither deter the misconduct of 
attorneys nor rid the profession of dishonest practitioners. The 
funds can only complement the actions of the disciplinary agen-
cies, remedying the injuries of clients that could not be prevented 
by the bar's efforts at self-regulation. It is doubtful that attorneys 
are willing to pay the high costs of a primarily remedial ap-
proach.113 Moreover, it is unlikely that public confidence can be 
maintained through an essentially remedial approach to profes-
sional regulation. 
II. NEW GOALS AND PROCEDURES 
Regardless of whether the present funds and disciplinary agen-
cies have been successful in achieving their goals, the response of 
the legal profession to the problem of attorney defalcations should 
also be evaluated in terms of additional goals that the bar should 
pursue in light of its responsibilities for professional self-
110 Address by Edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Fund Workshop (Feb. 
12, 1976). 
111 This predicament was noted by Douglas Sweet, the director of Research and De-
velopment for the Michigan State Bar. "The problem is that in a way we would like to 
publicize the fund but in another way it carries a degree of negativism, almost like asking 
people if they know any bad attorneys." Ann Arbor News, Oct. 27, 1976, at 7, col. I. 
112 Atkins & Kane, supra note 62, at 132. 
113 See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra. 
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regulation. In addition to reacting to cases of attorney misapprop-
riation through disciplinary proceedings and clients' security fund 
awards, the profession has a further obligation to the public and to 
its members to prevent such misconduct. 
To satisfy these additional responsibilities, a few states have 
developed new instrumentalities, including bookkeeping and ac-
counting requirements, 114 questionnaire and certificate require-
ments that provide evidence of attorney compliance with the Dis-
ciplinary Rules, 115 and periodic "compliance checks" that ascer-
tain whether attorneys have complied with the bank account and 
bookkeeping regulations. 116 These additional procedures are de-
signed to complement, not to supersede, ·the disciplinary proceed-
ings and the clients' security funds. In part, the new safeguards are 
intended to enhance the deterrent value of existing disciplinary 
penalties by increasing the likelihood that misappropriations by an 
attorney will be discovered. More importantly, however, these 
new procedures are designed to provide guidance to attorneys 
regarding the best ways to handle and to account for the funds of 
their clients. 
A. Trust Account Recordkeeping Requirements 
Disciplinary Rule 9-102(8)(3) of the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility requires attorneys to maintain "complete records of 
all funds, securities and other properties of a client coming into the 
possession of the lawyer." 117 Several states have elaborated upon 
this terse statement by promulgating detailed descriptions of the 
kinds of records and bookkeeping procedures that constitute 
"complete records. " 118 In some states, the specified records and 
114 See notes 117-47 and accompanying text infra .. 
115 See notes 148-56 and accompanying text infra. 
116 See notes 157-84 and accompanying text infra. 
117 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102(8)(3). 
118 DEL. CT. R. 33(2) (adopting the DELAWARE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102, INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES No. 2 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 
DELAWARE GUIDELINES); INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws imple-
menting Rule I I .02(4)(c); IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMIS-
SION, MANUAL ON AUDIT PROCEDURES; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2). A proposed court rule 
ordering bookkeeping procedures is now before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Letter from 
Carl E. Glock, Jr., to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
This article will also consider the recordkeeping rules established for Ontario and the lates• 
working draft of guidelines prepared by the ABA Standing Committee on Clients' Security 
Fund and the ABA Center for Professional Discipline entitled SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR 
RULES FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF FUNDS, SECURITIES AND OTHER PROPERTY 
HELD FOR CLIENTS AND OTHERS BY LAWYERS (Nov. 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as COMMIT-
TEE DRAFT). 
In addition to providing record keeping and accounting requirements, many of these descrip-
tions also elaborate on the requirement of DR 9-102(A) that clients' funds be deposited in "one 
or more identifiable bank accounts," by specifying that the bank account must be clearly 
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procedures are only advisory, 119 whereas in other states the pre-
scribed accounts and accounting procedures are mandatory .120 
Some of the latter states also stipulate that attorneys engaged in 
practice as a partnership or professional corporation are collec-
tively responsible for compliance with the rules to the extent that 
they maintain their records on a group basis. 121 All state re-
cordkeeping requirements indicate that the attorney must retain 
the records for a specified iength of time_ uz Attorneys acting as 
escrow agents, executors, guardians, trustees, conservators, or 
receivers may be subject to additional accounting requirements 
pursuant to state law or court rules. Preferable recordkeeping 
requirements attempt to free such attorney-fiduciaries from dup-
licative, and possibly contradictory, accounting requirements .123 
labeled as a "trust account" and must identify the attorney or partnership. E.g., ·wis. CT. R. § 
256.293(1); COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § 1(8). 
The Committee Draft also recommends that a separate fiduciary bank account be main-
tained for funds held by an attorney in his fiduciary capacity as an escrow agent, executor, 
guardian, trustee, conseivator, or receiver. COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note I 18, at § 
l(A)(l)(a). The recordkeeping directions for such funds require only that the bank account 
be reconciled monthly and that a list of the funds in the account, the person for whom the· 
funds are held, and the purpose for which the funds are being held be maintained. Id. at § 
IV(B)(8). 
The Delaware Guidelines and the proposed Pennsylvania rule also provide for a separate 
fiduciary bank account for money held in escrow for real estate transactions which may be 
maintained at the option of the attorney. A separate bank account and simpler accounting 
procedures are appropriate because attorneys in this type of practice might be involved in a 
relatively large number of transactions which would not· involve a continuing series of 
disbursements and deposits for the same client. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the 
author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
119 E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. See also Carpenter, supra note 2, at 
340. 
120 E.g., INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule 
I l.02(4)(c); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2). 
121 E.g., COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 118, at § III(C); PRo"POSED PA. CT. R. § 
81. IOI (2). The shared responsibility parallels the joint liability of lawyers engaged in a group 
practice for the misappropriations of any one of the attorneys in the firm, despite their 
personal innocence, based upon their status as partners or as co-trustees of the client trust 
bank account. See Blackmon v. Hale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. App. 1969), vacated on other 
grounds, I Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418 (1970). 
122 The specified period of retention begins with the year to which the records relate, 
except in the case of fiduciary records, where the retention period begins only after the 
completion of the fiduciary obligation. DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118, at 60 (five 
years); IowA CT. R. 121.4(a)(3) (five years); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81.101 (2)(b) (seven 
years); ONT. REG. 983/74, § 19(i)(2)(b) (five years). Since these records will be used 
primarily by courts either to discipline an attorney or to provide the client with a summary 
remedy for the attorney's conversion, it is not necessary to establish tiine limits with 
reference to any statutes of limitation. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author 
(Jan. 25, 1977). A "reasonable period" which conforms to state tax requirements for 
business records for record preseivation may be established. Such a time period should 
allow discovery of attorney-embezzlers before records are legitimately destroyed, and it 
would not impose an additional or conflicting obligation upon attorneys. Letter from John 
H. Nieman to the author (Feb. 10, 1977). 
123 For example, Florida exempts attorneys from the general recordkeeping requirements 
insofar as an attorney's handling of a client's funds is subject to an accounting rule imposed 
by law or court rule. INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Act. XI, bylaws implement-
ing Rule I l.02(4)(c). The Delaware Guidelines were also drafted with consideration for 
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The Delaware Guidelines contain the most thorough and effec-
tive suggestions with respect to the records and computational 
procedures that attorneys should use in accounting for clients' 
funds. 124 Three basic records are recommended: a cash receipts 
journal listing the source of each receipt and the date of the receipt; 
a disbursements journal listing the date of each disbursement and 
the payee; and a subsidiary ledger that contains a separate page for 
each client for whom monies have been received in trust, showing 
the dates and amounts of each receipt and disbursement and any 
unexpended balance. 125 Using· these records, bank statements, 
cancelled checks, and duplicate deposit slips, 126 attorneys are 
urged to perform two accounting procedures on a monthly basis 
and to retain a copy of their computations. First, a trial balance of 
the subsidiary ledger which shows the name of the client and the 
balance of the client's account as of the end of the month should be 
calculated. 127 Without such a monthly balance it would be difficult 
to review the accounts in the event of an audit. 128 Secondly, the 
attorney should reconcile the cash balances indicated by the re-
ceipts and disbursements journal totals, the bank statement bal-
ance, and the subsidiary ledger balance .129 For property other than 
cash, the Delaware Guidelines suggest only that some kind of 
record be kept and that the property be specifically identified. 130 
Furthermore, certain records and accounting procedures are 
suggested for monies received by an attorney that belong to him or 
existing statuto111 accounting re.quirements, so as to avoid duplication or conflict. Letter 
from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
124 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note I 18. The Delaware Guidelines were the product 
of a three-month effort by a committee of attorneys appointed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court, which worked with a committee of certified public accountants in drafting the 
accounting and bookkeeping suggestions. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338-39. The Iowa 
Client Security and Attorney Discipline Commission has recommended the Delaware 
Guidelines to its attorneys. IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COM-
MISSION, MANUAL ON AUDIT PROCEDURES 2 [hereinafter cited as IOWA AUDIT MANUAL]. 
The Committee Draft relies on the Delaware Guidelines in its recordkeeping requirements. 
Interview with James H. Bradner, Jr. (Feb. 23, 1977). 
125 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. 
126 Although the cancelled checks and duplicate deposit slips are listed separately in the 
Guidelines from the receipts and disbursements journals, the chairman of the committee that 
drafted the Guidelines has indicated that an attorney may maintain a file of cancelled checks 
and deposit slips in lieu of these two journals. Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the 
author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
127 DELAWARE Gu1DELINES, supra note I 18. The current balance shown in the subsidiary 
ledger should agree with the control figure computed by taking the balance at the beipnning 
of the month, adding the total of clients' money received for the month, and deductmg the 
total disbursements for the month. 
128 Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
129 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. 
130 Both the Committee Draft and the proposed Pennsylvania rules have additional require-
ments for securities and noncash property. Such property must be identified and labeled with 
the name of the client, and the records of such property must be kept in a separate place from 
where the property is held. PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81.102(b); COMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note 
118, at § ll(A). 
436 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415 
his firm. Specifically, the Delaware Guidelines suggest that attor-
neys keep a cash receipts journal, a cash disbursements journal, a 
fees book or a file of billing invoices, and a copy of the bank 
statements, cancelled checks, and deposit slips for the attorney's 
nonclient bank account. 131 The Guidelines also recommend a 
monthly reconciliation of the checkbook balance, the bank state-
ment balance, and the cash balance derived from the cash receipts 
and disbursements journal's totals. 132 Such records are essential if 
an auditor has to separate commingled client funds and personal 
monies of the attorney. 133 Moreover, the suggestions may assist 
attorneys who have only rudimentary accounting skills. 
One serious problem with the accounting rules of United States 
jurisdictions is their failure to define precisely which funds should 
be maintained in a separate client account and accounted for in 
accordance with the bookkeeping requirements. DR 9-102(A), 134 
which provides the definition of clients' trust funds, is ambiguous 
as to. whether fees paid in advance for specific services yet to be 
performed continue to belong to the client until the attorney per-
forms the services. 135 In addition, the Disciplinary Rule does not 
require that advances for costs and expenses be placed in a trust 
account and treated as clients' funds. 136 Yet if an attorney misap-
propriated such advances instead of applying them toward the 
client's expenses, such a defalcation would provide an adequate 
basis for discipline and a clients' security fund award. In effect, DR 
9-102 permits the commingling of advances for costs and expenses, 
but then punishes the defalcations which may result from such 
commingling. DR 9-102 also fails to specify that the interest earned 
by the funds in a client trust account belongs to the attorney's 
clients and not to the attorney .137 Since the rules do not mention 
how interest is to be accounted for, attorneys may innocently 
misappropriate interest that is earned by clients' funds. There is 
131 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118. 
132 /d. 
133 Letter from Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor for the Law Society of Upper Canada, to 
the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
134 See note 3 supra. 
135 See note 2 supra. The Professional Ethics Committee of The Florida B~r, in interpret-
ing DR 9-I02(A), has recently decided that such payments will be presumed to be intended 
by the client as the property of the attorney upon his receipt of the funds, unless there is 
evidence that the prepayment was intended and was designated as a "fee security" deposit. 
FLORIDA BAR COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ADVISORY OPINION No. 76-77, published 
in Florida Bar News, Jan. 20, 1977, at 5, col. I. In Iowa, however, the Client Security and 
Attorney Disciplinary Commission has decided that such prepayments should be retained in 
trust accounts until earned. NEWS BULL. OF THE low A ST. B. Ass'N, (Aug.-Sept. 1975). 
136 See note 3 supra. It is unclear whether DR 9-102(A) precludes the possibility of 
treating advances for costs and expenses as clients' trust funds or merely fails to require 
such treatment. 
137 See note 3 supra. 
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also a real question as to whether the attorney has a fiduciary 
obligation to place his clients' funds in an interest bearing account 
rather than allow them to lie dormant in a noninterest bearing 
demand account. 138 
The accounting rules for lawyers in the Canadian province of 
Ontario, 139 though similar to many of the aforementioned aspects 
of the Delaware Guidelines, are more successful in delineating 
which funds must be handled as trust funds. The Ontario definition 
of "client's trust funds" explicitly requires that advances for costs 
and fees for services not yet rendered must be maintained in a 
client trust account. 140 There is also no confusion as to interest 
earned on clients' funds, because Ontario expressly requires attor-
neys to hold clients' money in an interest bearing account and to 
pay the interest to the Law Foundation of Ontario, which uses the 
proceeds to fund legal education and research, legal aid programs, 
and law libraries. 141 
A second serious problem with United States accounting rules is 
their failure to specify which monies must be placed in a client trust 
account, which monies may be placed in such an account, and 
which funds may not be deposited in a client trust account. The 
Ontario bookkeeping rules, in contrast, clearly delineate which 
funds fall into each of these three categories .142 Some attorneys 
may view regulations or suggestions regarding the making of de-
posits and withdrawals as unnecessary restrictions. The clear de-
finition of the scope of an attorney's duties and discretion provided 
by such rules, however, is for the guidance as well as the supervi-
sion of attorneys, and may be more helpful than coercive. 
Despite the variations in the recordkeeping guidelines and re-
quirements of different jurisdictions, the policies justifying the 
procedures are similar. An ABA-sponsored report on professional 
discipline advocated that attorneys should be required to keep 
adequate records of clients' funds. 143 The Clark Report cited two 
reasons for its recommendation: first, that a recordkeeping re-
quirement would assist disciplinary investigations into complaints 
of misappropriations, and second, that a combination of account-
ing rules and a program of annual audits would deter attorney 
mishandling of funds. 144 In addition to effectuating the goals of 
discipline and deterre~ce, however, recordkeeping rules are de-
138 Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
139 ONT. REG. 983/74, §§ 17-20 (The Law Society Act) (1974). 
140 Id. § 18(3). 
141 Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, ch. 238, § 5J(f). 
142 ONT. REG. 983/74, § 18(4-8), (The Law Society Act) (1974). 
143 See CLARK REPORT, supra note JO, at 173. 
144 Id. 
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signed to instruct and to guide honest attorneys. For example, 
prescribed bookkeeping and accounting procedures may prevent 
the negligent misappropriation that can occur when, as a result of 
inadequate recordkeeping, the attorney negligently spends money 
for personal purposes. 145 Furthermore, the existence of explicit 
minimum requirements for recordkeeping, even where the discov-
ery of misconduct is unlikely, confronts a disorganized attorney 
with the fact that he is in violation of the Disciplinary Rules and 
therefore may be subject to disciplinary action. Cognizance of his 
noncompliance may induce the attorney to fulfill his respon-
sibilities. Most importantly, guidelines which encompass more 
than minimum requirements and provide comprehensive sugges-
tions can perform a "channeling function." 146 The attorney who 
seeks to comply with the requirements of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility is provided with a specific model and a standard of 
conduct, rather than vague exhortations about character and hon-
esty_ 141 
B. Certificates of Compliance and Questionnaires 
In addition to imposing recordkeeping requirements, several. 
states require attorneys to file annual reports regarding their client 
trust bank accounts. The simplest kind of trust account report 
merely requires each practicing attorney148 to file a statement 
indicating that he has read and has substantially complied with the 
145 It has been argued that misappropriating attorneys often did not begin with a fixed 
intention to embezzle and were initially unaware of any impropriety as a consequence of 
inadequate accounting or commingling. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 338. However, some 
commentators have insisted that the vast majority of attorney misappropriations are the 
result of deliberate fraud. Letter from Charles 0. Fisher, Chairman, Clients' Security Trust 
Fund of the Bar of Maryland, to the author (Feb. 3, 1977); Letter from David 0. Haughey, 
Chairman, Client Security Fund Committee of the State Bar of Michigan, to the author 
(Nov. 15, 1976). The truth probably lies somewhere between these two observations. When 
attorneys start using client's funds, they may intentionally allow their bookkeeping to 
become inaccurate and incomplete so as to obscure or excuse their misappropriation. 
Although bookkeeping requirements are useless as guides for dishonest attorneys, the 
requirements may serve as the basis for disciplining such attorneys, who might otherwise 
have avoided a stiff penalty for defalcation by claiming their inadequate records as an 
excuse. Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel for the Florida Bar, to the author 
(Jan. 31, 1977). 
146 Cf., Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (illustrating how 
legal standards serve as guides and models, in addition to defining the minimum perform-
ance required to constitute compliance with mandatory rules). 
147 The chairman of the committee which drafted the Delaware Guidelines noted: "We 
suggested books and records ... [so] that those who wanted to be extra safe [could be surel 
that by having these specific books and records they were certainly complying with the 
Guideline." Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
148 Generally, judges or attorneys who are full-time employees of a government agency or 
a business corporation are not required to file a report because they do not handle the funds 
of individual clients. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.3(i)(4). Similarly, such attorneys are often either 
exempted from an obligation to contribute to a clients' security fund or are allowed to make 
a reduced payment. E.g., low A CT. R. 121.4(b)(l). 
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rules regarding client trust accounts .149 Some states require that 
every attorney or partnership submit answers to a questionnaire 
which asks whether adequate records of clients' funds are main-
tained and whether a separate clients' trust bank account is 
kept. 150 The questionnaire also requests the attorney to list the 
banks where clients' accounts are maintained and to disclose the 
name and number of such accounts. 151 If an attorney fails to submit 
a certificate or to answer a questionnaire, he may risk summary 
suspension from the bar. 152 
In addition to requiring attorneys to file a combined certificate 
a.rid questionnaire, Ontario requires that each attorney employ a 
public accountant to examine the attorney's records. The accoun-
tant does not conduct an in-depth audit, but is only required to 
ascertain whether the records on their face appear to comply with 
the Ontario bookkeeping regulations .153 The report of the accoun-
tant does not purport to be an audit. In fact, because the accountant 
does not verify the accuracy of the records by contacting the 
attorney's clients, inspect the files of the attorney apart from the 
records that the attorney furnishes for his investigation, or check 
on the sufficiency of internal controls, the report offers only 
slightly more protection than the attorney's own certificate of 
compliance. 154 
The self-certifying nature of these provisions suggests that ques-
tionnaires and certificates of compliance are not designed primarily 
to expose embezzling attorneys. The principal functions of these 
requirements seem to be to notify attorneys of their professional 
responsibilities and to encourage them to satisfy these duties. 
Thus, the success of a certificate requirement in generating attor-
ney compliance depends upon the expectation that most attorneys 
will establish a separate bank account for clients' funds and will 
149 E.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA 
BAR, Art. XI, bylaws implementing Rule I 1.02(4)(c); N.M. Sur. CT. RULES GOVERNING 
DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b); PROPOSED PA. CT. R. § 81. 103. 
150 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; WIS. CT. R. 256.293(2). 
151 DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; low ACT. R. 121.4(b)(l). While New Mexico 
does not require a listing of banks and account names and titles, it does require attorneys to 
describe the actual records maintained for clients' funds in sufficient detail so that the 
function of each record can be understood. Attorney's Certification of Records Form, as 
authorized by N.M. SUP. CT. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE, Rule l l(b). 
152 The Iowa rules, for example, provide for the summary suspension of any attorney who 
fails to submit a questionnaire, provided that a notice of delinquency has been served upon 
him thirty days prior to his suspension. IowA CT. R. 121.3(i)(7). Once suspended, the 
attorney may be reinstated only upon a showing that his prior failure to comply was not 
willful and that he has subsequently filed the questionnaire answers or certificate. low A CT. 
R. 121.3(i)(9). 
153 Form 3 Report, as authorized by ONT. REG. 983/74, § 20(2) (The Law Society Act) 
(1974). 
154 Telephone interview with Robert Anderson, Chief Auditor of the Law Society of 
Upper Canada (Mar. 18, 1977). 
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keep adequate records in order to be able to sign the certificate in 
good faith. A questionnaire, on the other hand, does not rely 
exclusively on the lawyer's conscience. When an attorney knows 
that his noncompliance with the rules, particularly a failure to 
maintain a separate client bank account, can be quickly de-
tected, 155 he may be more likely to establish a separate account. 
Accordingly, if a transfer out of a separate client trust account is 
required before the attorney can spend the ciients' funds, inadvert-
ent misappropriations resulting from lax accounting will be re-
duced, and intentional defalcations will be easier to identify .156 By 
deterring commingling, the certificate and the questionnaire re-
quirements help solve a central problem of attorney defalcations. 
C. Audits and Compliance Checks 
A number of jurisdictions provide for the inspection of the client 
trust bank accounts and the accounting records required by DR 
9-102. 157 There are basically two kinds of inspections. The first 
kind consists of comprehensive audits that are triggered by a credi-
ble client complaint or by other circumstances constituting good 
cause. The Florida audit provision, for example, empowers the 
appropriate disciplinary agency to order a complete audit if the 
attorney has failed to file a certificate or questionnaire, or if a 
check that he has drawn on his client trust account has been 
returned for insufficient funds. 158 Other circumstances which 
suggest possible misconduct are also sufficient to trigger an au-
dit.159 For example, if an attorney fails to distribute funds for a 
client, a broader investigation of his records would probably be 
justified. The definition of the conditions constituting good cause 
within the meaning of such rules is broad and general in order to 
grant disciplinary authorities substantial discretion in their investi-
gations.160 
In a more comprehensive proposal, the Clark Report recom-
mended that complete annual audits be required of every attorney 
155 The questionnaire should include a written authorization to be signed by the attorney 
that will permit disciplinary officials to inspect the bank accounts claimed by the attorney in 
his answers to the questionnaire. 
156 Letter from Edmund N. Carpenter II to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
157 See, e.g., DELAWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 118; INTEGRATION RULE OF THE 
FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(b); low A CT. R. 12l.4(a); Mo. CT. R. BVIS; N.J. CT. 
R. l:28-6(a); Wis. CT. R. 256.293(2). 
158 INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule I l.02(4)(a). 
159 Letter from Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel of the Florida Bar, to the author 
(Jan. 31, 1977). 
160 According to the chairman of the Maryland Clients' Security Fund, the "good cause" 
requirement was intentionally designed "to allow the disciplinary agencies to discover a 
possible pattern of defalcation when only the tip of the iceberg is visible." Letter from 
Charles 0. Fisher to the author (Feb. 3, 1977). 
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regardless of any evidence of wrongdoing. 161 The committees 
which drafted the Delaware and Pennsylvania guidelines consid-
ered requiring such annual audits for each attorney, but decided 
not to recommend such a requirement. 162 Both committees found 
that the cost would be excessive, especially for attorneys who, 
prior to the promulgation of the accounting guidelines, maintained 
few records. In Delaware, it would also have been difficult to find 
enough accountants to undertake the work. 163 
The second inspection mechanism is a "compliance check" that 
involves a cursory examination of the client trust account records 
in order to determine wheth~r the attorney is maintaining records 
that satisfy the jurisdiction's bookkeeping requirements. Of the 
two states with compliance check programs, Iowa has the more 
successful and highly developed system.164 The Iowa program 
employs full-time accountants, rather than relying upon outside 
public accountants, because full-time staff auditors are more effec-
tive in uncovering fraud and are less expensive. 165 Before conduct-
ing compliance checks ofa few attorneys in a particular county, a 
161 CLARK REPORT, supra note 10, at 173·. 
162 Letter from Carl E. Glock, Jr., Chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee which 
drafted the 'proposed court rules, to Michael Franck (July 21, 1976). Carpenter, supra note 2, 
at 339. 
1s3 Id. 
164 The Iowa program was established by court rule in late 1973. In 1974, its audits·were 
confined to 29 attorneys against whom specific co~plaints had been-lodged. In 1975, the 
auditors, who are employed by a special commission that the court created to administer the 
client security fund and the audit program, completed regular audits and compliance checks 
at over 542 law offices. The average estimated cost of each compliance check was between 
25 and 50 dollars. Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Oct. 28, 1976); THE CLIENT 
SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT. 
The trustees of the Delaware Client Security Fund have been authorized to undertake a 
program of compliance checks and audits. As in Iowa, audits are financed by the same 
monies used to provide awards to clients. The trustees have experienced difficulties in 
starting their program, because they have been unable to accumulate a sufficient amount in 
the fund to begin compliance checks. Substantial defalcations, which might have been 
detected early or deterred altogether if a compliance check program had been in operation, 
have depleted the assets of the fund on several occasions and postponed the compliance 
check pro~ram. Address by Edmund N. Carpenter II, ABA Clients' Security Workshop 
(Feb. 12, 1976). 
Since 1962, Ontario has had a program of inspections involving "spot audits" which are 
conducted on a random basis, "blitz audits" which cover all the la~ . JJffices in a certain 
geographical area, and comprehensive audits which result from client complaints about an 
attorney's conduct. The audit staff includes five chartered accountants. While they concen-
trate on audits based upon complaints or suspicious circumstances, the auditors also 
conduct over 30 "blitz" audits each month. Address by George H. Lockhead, Chairman, 
Disciplinary Committee of the Law So~iety of Upper Canada, Board of Governors of the 
State Bar of Wisconsin (Apr. 18, 1975); Letter from Robert Anderson to the author (Nov. 29, 
1976). 
165 In Ontario, it has been found that as a result of their extensive experience in conduct-
ing the cursory "blitz" and "sP9t" audits, the staff auditors have. become specialists in this 
field. Hence, they require less direction than outside accountants and know where to look 
for evidence of financial irregularities. Staff auditors are also more adept at preparing audit 
reports which laymen can understand and are better witnesses at disciplinary hearings. 
Letter from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977). 
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preliminary letter is sent to all attorneys in the county. The letter 
informs the attorneys of approximately when the checks will occur 
and reminds them that the checks are not the result of any com-
plaints, but are conducted regularly on a random basis. By notify-
ing the attorneys in the target area of the impending inspections, 
the letter enables them to update their books. It also facilitates the 
arrangement of appointments to conduct the audit at the attorney's 
office.166 Most importantly, such a letter to all area attorneys, 
which reminds them that an audit may be triggered without proba-
ble cause, removes the stigma that might otherwise attach to an 
attorney who is subjected to an audit by the disciplinary agency .167 
The actual compliance check investigation is relatively simple. 
The auditor first ascertains whether adequate records168 are being 
kept. Then he inspects the account records, the check book, the 
bank statements, the deposit slips, and the cancelled checks to 
determine if there is any evidence of misappropriation. 169 If the 
inspection reveals that there is reasonable cause to believe that a 
defalcation has occurred, the auditor ceases his inspection to allow 
the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation to conduct a complete 
criminal inquiry .170 Lesser forms of misconduct, such as in-
adequate recordkeeping, are usually reported to the commission 
which operates the clients' security fund and inspection program, 
and the commission contacts the attorney about correcting the 
deficiencies. 171 
Attorneys sometimes refuse to allow an auditor to inspect their 
records, basing their objections either on a fifth amendment claim 
of privilege from self-incrimination or on the need to preserve 
166 IOWA AUDIT MANUAL, ·supra note 124, at 2. 
167 Once subjected to an audit, an attorney may be informally stigmatizei, by his peers 
even though his books and records are found to be in compliance with the requirements. By 
using both compliance checks which are conducted on a random basis and regular audits 
which are based on complaints, no suspicions of guilt are likely to arise from the fact that an 
attorney has been audited. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 340." 
168 Although Iowa has recommended the Delaware Guidelines to its attorneys, see notes 
124-33 and accompanying text supra, it has only required the maintenance of records which 
show the disbursements, the receipts, and the balance for each client. low A AUDIT MAN-
UAL, supra note 124, at l, 2. 
169 The Iowa Audit Manual sets out the principal steps for the auditor to follow: 
Usually, the auditor will first examine the lawyer's trust account by reconciling the 
ledgered client account balances with the trust account check book and bank 
statement. He should make at least a cursory examination to make certain that 
trust account checks are not being written to cover personal or business expenses 
of the lawyer. If the bank statement reflects any overdrafts, an explanation is 
required. If the clients' accounts reflect debit balances outstanding for any length 
of time the auditor may ask for an explanation or ask to see the files .... In 
addition, a review should be made of the general office receipts journal to see if 
clients' funds are being improperly treated. 
IowA AUDIT MANUAL, supra note 124, at l, 2. 
170 Id. at 4. 
1111d. 
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confidential information concerning their clients. Given the present 
state of the case law, it is unclear whether an attorney can legiti-
mately assert the fifth amendment claim of privilege as the basis for 
his refusal to release the records of his client trust account that he 
is required by law or court rule to maintain. One state court has 
held that the record requirements of DR 9-102, when adopted as a 
court rule, come within the "required records" doctrine of Shapiro 
v. United States 172 and must be produced for inspection by the 
proper authorities. 173 
In some states, where the confidential communications relate to 
an attorney defalcation, a client privilege for the attorney to invoke 
may not exist. 174 Some states take precautions to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure of financial information about clients' 
transactions175 and provide safeguards to limit disclosure if the 
records are used in disciplinary proceedings involving the attor-
ney. 176 Apparently, the confidentiality objections of many attor-
neys are based less on a concern for their clients' privacy than on 
their apprehension about a review of their records by a fellow 
172 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court held that because the records requested by investigating 
authorities were required to be kept pursuant to federal regulation and were therefore 
"public" in nature, a defendaflt could not withhold the records from an authorized agency 
request based on his fifth amendment privilege. 
173 Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 305 A.2d 845 (1973), cert. denied, 414 u:s. 1065 
(1973). But see Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 °(1967), where the Court held that the 
imposition of discipline on an attorney, who refused to respond to inquiries into his 
professional conduct on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him, violates the 
attorney's constitutional rights. 
174 In Wisconsin, for example, there is no client privilege as to a communication relating 
to an attorney's·breach of his duty to his client. Wis. CT. R. § 905.03(4)(c). In Parry-Jones v. 
Law Soc'y, 1 Ch. App. 1 (1967), the court stated: 
The law implies a term into a contract whereby a professional man is to keep his 
clients' affairs secret and not to disclose them to anyone without just cause .... 
[But] the contract between solicitor and client must be taken to contain this 
implication: the solicitor must obey the law, and, in particular, he must comply 
with the rules made under the authority of statute for the conduct of the profession. 
If the rules require him to disclose his client's affairs, then he must do so. 
175 The proposed Wisconsin rules, for example, stipulate that the attorney's records will 
not be disclosed except upon order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, or for use as evidence 
in a disciplinary hearing if the attorney has failed to comply with DR 9-102. Disciplinary 
agency personnel who make unauthorized disclosures of attorney records are subject to 
punishment. Wisconsin Clients' Trust Funds Accounts Compliance Rules, Wisconsin B. 
Bull. at 56 (Aug. 1976). 
176 Florida, for example, makes the following provision for the protection of clients: 
[N]otice of such intended use shall be given to any client involved, if practicable, 
unless such client is already aware of such intended use, and upon good cause 
shown by such client the admission of the same shall be under circumstances as 
shall be reasonably calculated thereafter to protect the confidence of such client. 
... Permissible_ means of protection shall not prejudice the respondent or accused 
attorney, and may include but are not limited to excision, in camera production, 
retention in sealed envelopes or similar devices. 
INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, Art. XI, Rule 1 J.04(4)(c). See also CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 6087, Rule 120. 
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lawyer, especially if he is a competitor .177 Where an impartial 
auditor conducts the investigation and there are safeguards against 
unauthorized disclosure of the investigative finidings, few attor-
neys refuse to divulge information based on the attorney-client 
relationship. 178 
While a compliance check program is more controversial than 
recordkeeping, certificate, or questionnaire requirements, 179 it ful-
fiiis severai professionai self-regulation objectives. A program of 
compliance checks that is combined with a useful set of accounting 
guidelines furnishes disorganized attorneys with the motivation 
and the means to maintain adequate records, thus decreasing the 
risk of "negligent" defalcations. 180 In addition, spot checks and 
recordkeeping rules deter attorneys who may otherwise "borrow" 
from their clients' funds. 181 Furthermore, with regard to the attor-
ney who is not deterred, compliance checks may uncover defalca-
tions before they involve substantial sums of money and numerous 
clients. 182 As a result, the lawyer may still be financially able to 
make restitution. Even if restitition is impossible, however, early 
detection of the defalcation may minimize the client security fund 
payments needed to reimburse the losses. 
In additio!l to serving deterrent and enforcement functions, the 
existing compliance check procedures also perform a guidance role 
for the profession. Where advance notice is given of impending 
compliance checks, an inspection can serve as an opportunity for 
lawyers to become educated in proper trust accounting methods 
and will alert them to their professional responsibilties in this 
area. 183 In fact, auditors in Iowa and Ontario devote a substantial 
1 77 Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Feb. IO, 1977). 
118 Id. 
179 A proposal for bookkeeping requirements, a certificate of compliance, l!,Ild audits or 
compliance checks of the required records was considered recently by the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association, but only the bookkeeping and certificate proposals were finally recommended 
to the Supreme Court for promulgation as court rules. Interview with Carl E. Glock, Jr., 
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Committee which drafted the proposed rules (Oct. 14, 1976). 
180 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 479 (1967). 
181 Id. 
182 Letter from John H. Neiman to the author (Oct. 28, 1976). Defalcation by an attorney 
often involves the funds of more than one client. For example, the Ontario Clients' Security 
Fund, from its inception in 1953 until the end of 1976, has made awards to 958 clients on 
account of only 104 former solicitors. Letter from Robert Anderson to .the author (Jan. 25, 
1977). 
183 IOWA CLIENT SECURITY AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, 1974 ANNUAL 
REPORT 7 
The Iowa Audit Procedures Manual closes with the reminder that "the vast majority of 
lawyers are honest, but some are dilatory, and some do not keep sufficient records. Hence, a 
part of the job of the auditor is to assist in educ&ting the lawyer." low A AUDIT MANUAL, 
supra note 124, at 4. 
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amount of time to counseling and consulting with attorneys in 
addition to their primary task of checking the adequacy of attor-
neys' financial records. 184 In this respect, compliance checks can 
be conducted as part of a preventive program that has few griev-
ance or disciplinary functions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In 1970, the Clark Report observed that the attitudes of attorneys 
toward professional discipline ranged from apathy to active hostil-
ity .185 Frequently, reform of the self-regulatory mechanisms onhe 
legal profession occurs only when outside forces threaten the pro-
fessional privilege of self-discipline .186 The misconceived notion 
that self-regulation connotes only discipline and punishment is 
partially responsible for the reluctance of the profession to improve 
its self-regulatory system. The format of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility expressly rejects such a limited conception of self-
regulation. Admittedly, the Code contains Disciplinary Rules 
which establish minimum standards for attorneys who seek. to 
comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of the Code. However, the 
Code also contains the aspirational Ethical Considerations that are 
intended "for the 'good man,' as a beacon to assist him in navigat-
ing an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of 
professional conduct. " 187 Attorneys deserve the guidance and in-
struction that recordkeeping guidelines, certificates and question-
naires, and compliance checks provide. Clients' security funds, by 
compensating for the losses of clients that the disciplinary proce-
184 Address by Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., Joint Meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on 
Clients' Security Fund and the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Aug. 4, 1973); letter 
from Robert Anderson to the author (Jan. 25, 1977); letter from John H. Neiman to the 
author (Feb. 10, 1977). Mr. Neiman indicates in his letter that the Iowa auditors, when asked 
for advice about effective auditing procedures, usually take a "soft pedal" approach, 
suggesting possible approaches without any dogmatic assertions about a "single, correct" 
way to keep accounts. 
185 CLARK REPORT, supra note 25, at I. 
186 The Clark Report warned that "[t]he profession does not have much time remaining to 
reform its own disciplinary structure .... Public dissatisfaction is increasing .... We will 
compound our own cure or someone else will mix up a dose that will curl our hair." CLARK 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-9. Recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Professional 
Discipline warned tht if the profession did not deal with the matter of the attorney discipline 
system in federal courts, Congress may authorize the U.S. attorneys, who are also court-
room adversaries of the private bar, to take over discipline enforcement in the federal 
courts. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1977, at 5, col. I. 
187 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974). 
446 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:415 
dures failed to deter, have complemented the traditional efforts at 
self-regulation. Unlike the new procedures, however, the effects of 
the funds are strictly remedial and not preventive. Acceptance and 
implementation of the emerging preventive procedures should 
demonstrate that effective self-regulation can protect both clients 
and attorneys without necessarily increasing the use of disciplinary 
sanctions. 
---G-regory Dunbar Soule 
